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A ‘Post-Work’ World: 
Geographical Engagements with the Future of Work 
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Abstract 
This article reviews geographical research on labour market changes that pose a 
challenge to ‘work’ as a compelling category of analysis. Drawing inspiration from 
feminist scholarship that has sought to develop a frame for thinking about the concept 
of work so that other activities outside employment are recognised, it critically 
considers what everyday practices of work, including domestic and reproductive 
labour, can teach us about the realities and futures of contemporary capitalism. While 
‘work’ has long served as a presumed norm or telos of ‘development’, this article 
considers the prospect of the ‘end of work’ and of a specific type of accompanying 
capitalist society. It outlines the challenges for policy making in bringing forth a ‘post-
work’ world without cementing social and economic inequality. 
 




In a context where the nature of capitalist production is changing dramatically, the 
enduring importance of the structure and experience of work is testament to the hold 
that its imaginary has over society. Economically, the selling of labour power provides 
a means of gaining access to material necessities such as food, clothing and housing 




on). Culturally, the sense of maturity and independence connoted by employment 
illustrates the value placed on work outside the home in both personal and social 
development. Part-time employment is perceived by many as a rite of passage for 
adolescents, and the connection between identity and occupation forged from a young 
age – for example, through the questioning of children as to what they want to be when 
they grow up. Politically, the priority afforded to jobs and employability within both left 
and right politics suggests that the socio-economic relationship between a worker and 
an employer should be a primary concern of contemporary government policy. 
Traditional right political discourse is enmeshed with the economic imperatives of 
strategies to improve employability and ‘make work pay’, while the traditional left-wing 
emphasis on equality and social justice is invoked through an agenda to improve pay 
and working rights. There is, then, a tacit valorisation of work and employment which 
persists in spite of some significant labour market shifts. 
 
Given that ‘work’ has served for so long as a presumed norm or telos of 
‘development’,1 this article considers the prospect of the ‘end of work’ and of a specific 
type of accompanying capitalist society. It reviews geographical research on changes 
in the organisation of work and workers lives that pose a challenge to ‘work’ as a 
compelling category of analysis, including automation, the degradation of work and 
the rise of zero-hour contracts. Drawing inspiration from feminist scholarship that has 
sought to develop a frame for thinking about the concept of work so that other activities 
outside employment are recognised, it critically considers what everyday practices of 
work, including domestic and reproductive labour, can teach us about the realities and 




makers are outlined as the article assesses the role of technology and automation in 
transforming work and bringing forth a ‘post-work’ world. 
 
2. The ‘Future of Work’: Geographical Perspectives 
In the decade since the onset of the global financial crisis, there has been a wave of 
rapid automation touted as the ‘fourth industrial revolution’.2 Nascent technology 
breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, robotics, the Internet of Things, autonomous 
vehicles, 3d printing, nanotechnology, biotechnology, materials science, energy 
storage and quantum computing are expected to fundamentally transform the way in 
which we live and work in the future by making visible the limits to the productivist 
model of work that governs capitalist society. With robots and programmes 
substituting an ever-greater number of the work activities that humans perform, the 
construction of work as a social and moral good is projected to become increasingly 
strained. Automation can occur in many forms and over recent decades technology 
has tended to increase human exploitation as the machine becomes progressively 
more central for human resource decisions. In many sectors, management has 
already begun to quantify labour in ways that extend the forces of individual and 
internalised neoliberalism that sociologist Nikolas Rose refers to as ‘autonomisation’ 
and ‘responsibilisation’.3 Surveillance technologies, for instance, are reconstructing 
the nature, boundaries and governance of work through different forms of electronic 
performance monitoring, algorithmic management and people analytics that require 
actors at multiple levels to assume more responsibilities and greater accountability in 
processes of economic production. A key societal and policy challenge is thus to 




economic risk, control over their lives at work, and ability to contribute and be listened 
to in the workplace. 
 
Occurring in the midst of an unprecedented stagnation – or in some industries a 
decline – in real wages as a result of the global financial crisis and subsequent 
recession,4 automation is associated with the production of ‘precarious workers’ that 
cluster in particular jobs and sectors of the labour market. Alongside a rapid escalation 
in the global number of migrants and refugees, automation serves to enable the 
flexible and efficient organisation of labour in which workers phase in and out of 
employment in response to prevailing economic conditions. For this reason, the 
consequences of automation in relation to the temporal aspect of work are frequently 
noted. Automation is associated with both long and short hours, as well as anti-social 
hours. Automation is also discussed with particular attention to the growth of 
underemployment, either by hours worked or skills utilised. In Western nations, 
automation is further related to the increased incidence of self-employment and zero-
hour contracts in which there is an absence of statutory rights and protections. The 
rise of the ‘self-employed’ online services delivery driver, the Uber taxi cab driver or 
Deliveroo food delivery biker are evidence of new and different engagements within 
the ‘sharing’ or ‘on demand’ economy.5 Combining demand and supply to disrupt 
exiting industry structures, gig economy opportunities are now generated through 
online platforms that seek to harness immaterial labour across geographically 
disparate communities. Thus, whilst job tenures have risen during the last 15 years, 
there are very visible markers of insecurity for some groups resulting from the 




occupations.6 For this reason, automation is often cited as a factor in growing levels 
of socio-economic inequality.7 
 
Of course, this isn’t the first time that society has experienced the impacts of 
technological advancement and its attendant hopes and fears. Similar arguments 
about automation and socio-economic upheaval can be traced from the 
industrialisation of agriculture, to 19th century discussions of the mechanisation of work 
during the Industrial Revolution, to the advent of Fordist and post-Fordist systems of 
production in the 20th century. The difference with these earlier processes of 
automation is that they tended to impact specific sectors of the economy (e.g. 
agriculture, motor manufacturing), creating a large pool of reserve labour that could 
be absorbed into other sectors of the labour market. However, the ‘digital turn’ we are 
seeing today involves the automation of highly trained white-collar employment in 
addition to blue-collar roles. In contrast to earlier periods, technological advancement 
now affects all sectors of economy as the propensity for work to be performed by 
machines is primarily dependent on whether or not the tasks performed are routine. 
Some reports suggest that 80 per cent of jobs are capable of being automated either 
fully or in part8 and it is estimated that more than a fifth of the global labour force – 
more 800 million workers – could lose their jobs owing to the ‘rise of the robots’.9 Other 
analyses highlight that those most vulnerable to these job losses are precisely those 
individuals who are already the most precariously-placed in our societies, working in 
low to mid-skill positions which are relatively routine and without substantial creative 





Collective imaginaries of our automated future now abound throughout popular media 
and political discourse, oscillating between the techno-utopian vision of a global 
Silicon Valley of clean efficiency and hyper productivity, and a techno-dystopian and 
Martix-esque vision of devastating social and environmental collapse. Within the social 
and political sciences, scholars have responded to these visions with a renewed focus 
on labour and workplaces in which a fundamental shift in the relationship of humans 
to employment is posited. At one level, some scholars engage with the this notion of 
the future of work as a dystopia, viewing automation as threatening to sweep away 
whole sectors of employment and intensifying a context of generalised precarity in 
‘feminised labour’ (a term which references the changing nature of employment where 
irregular conditions – once thought to be the hallmark of women’s ‘secondary’ 
employment – have become widespread for both sexes). However, there is also a 
burgeoning literature emerging today in which the new forms of work and life emerging 
through automation are celebrated for their utopian possibilities. One of the most 
provocative examples of this utopian future thinking is Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams’ 
Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work in which automation 
is perceived as an opportunity for a fundamental recasting of Left politics. The 
development of technologies that replace human labour, in their view, should be 
promoted and accelerated as a means of liberating humanity from the drudgery of 
work, whilst simultaneously making society wealthier through increased productivity.11 
Rather than be seeing automation as a threat, research in this vein seeks to foster a 
more open debate about technology and work so the role that innovation must 





We believe that geographers are well placed to make important and nuanced 
contributions to these debates around a ‘Post-Work’ future. Geography has long 
engaged in research that highlights the uneven outcomes of labour market 
engagement, and the current research conducted by geographers on the impacts of 
automation is helping to bring forth a renewed attention to the spatially differentiated 
impacts of the technological transition we are witnessing today. For example, 
geographers have argued that contemporary debates around the impacts of 
automation have mostly been insensitive to their uneven distribution across the globe 
and have outlined the extent to which the promises and risks outlined in the literature 
might be specific to countries in the Global North. In particular, geographers have 
argued the need for more empirically grounded analyses of economies of the Global 
South where the bulk of the low-skill and low-wage employment opportunities most at 
risk of automation are concentrated. The rise of youth unemployment in countries like 
China, for example, estimated by the International Labour Organisation to be 11.1% 
in 2016, is seen as a sign of the struggle for economies to absorb the new reserves of 
labour created by technological unemployment.12 Geographers have also been 
interested in the emerging global division of labour generated by the transition to 
automated economies, with the expectation that certain countries in the Global South 
will continue to fulfil a pivotal role in the production process of these new technologies 
as well as the sourcing of the raw materials required to build them. In addition, 
research has also predicted that the rise of the digital economy is likely to further 
entrench regional inequalities within countries, through the ever-greater concentration 






Feminist geographical scholars have further argued that, as the economic lives of men 
and women are unequal, they will be affected by technological change in different 
ways. Automation will likely exacerbate existing sexual divisions of labour, further 
concentrating (predominantly middle-class, white) men in high paid roles owing to a 
growth of engineering, science and technology posts where they are traditionally 
overrepresented, while women and men from less advantaged social backgrounds 
remain clustered in the lower end of the labour market where skills such as empathy 
or manual handing are desired, but not typically well paid. At the same time, feminist 
scholars have highlighted how discussions of automation in the post-work literature 
have tended to focus on the workplace with much less attention to its impacts on the 
sphere of domestic or reproductive work.13 Smart technologies – such as Roomba 
robot vacuum cleaners; digital assistants like Amazon’s Alexa and Apple’s Siri; smart 
thermostats – have become ‘part of the furniture’ in automated homes of the Global 
North. Scholars have sought to reveal the continuities and changes in reproductive 
labour and in what ways, and to what extent, new technologies like those listed above 
are affecting progress towards more equal and respectful home lives. Helen Hester, 
for example, has shown how the stereotypical characteristics of femininity are quite 
literally programmed into these machines – such as the use of female voices in apps 
like Siri – which reinforces dominant gender assumptions and norms.14 Deborah 
Chambers has also shown how advertisements for new domestic technologies have 
tended to target a dominant technologised masculinity such that women remain 
marginalised in the automated home.15 A key focus of feminist research on automation 
has thus been to question whether we risk a return of women to unpaid care and 






Recognising the analytical implications of making women visible in research enquiries, 
recent studies of work and employment provoke us to consider what our families and 
communities will look like if technological advancement cements differences of 
gender, as well as class, race, sexuality and (dis)ability. By calling into question the 
centrality afforded to capitalist employment relations and insisting on expanding the 
concept of labour beyond its waged form, geographical studies highlight the need for 
governments to support and encourage other activities outside work. Many build upon 
Kathi Weeks’ ‘post-work imaginary’, which proffers a politics that responds to critical 
challenges that confront workers in the present moment of crisis and transformation.16 
Weeks does not oppose work per se but seeks to find opportunity in the ‘deskilling’ 
and unemployment that some worry will result from digital technologies in the fourth 
industrial revolution. Automation, in this sense, becomes the basis on which demands 
are made for a post-work world that would allow people to be productive and creative 
without being bound to the capitalist employment relation. 
 
Redressing abstracted frameworks of a post-work world, empirical studies of workers 
inhabiting the intersecting spaces of work and home progress what Weeks terms a 
‘politics of life against work’ that is attuned to what already exists in practice. The 
ambition is to expose the anti-essentialist quality of the capitalist employment relation 
and use this as a foundation for challenging the valorisation of work in contemporary 
society. For example, feminist geographer J-K Gibson-Graham has explored the 
alternative (non-capitalist) forms of exchange and community emerging in response 
to dominant discourses of the work society.17 By mapping the many different ways in 




generative knowledge that points towards the possibilities for enacting and fostering 
alternative economic practices. It allows us to imagine and regulate into existence 
effective means of ‘taking back the economy’ at local scales.18 
 
3. Realising a ‘Post Work’ World 
The feminist imperative to collectively produce situated knowledge provides a detailed 
insight into the means to support, reproduce and replicate co-operatives, mutuals and 
other member-based organisations that reconstitute work as a grassroots response to 
the precarity within increasingly automated societies. However, the task of connecting 
local practices of work within ‘community economies’ to a broader international 
agenda to establish a post-work world remains challenging. How do we nurture 
politically, socially, and ethically within our communities and networks the affordances 
of automation when global inequalities of work persist? One iteration of the post-work 
future posits four ‘demands’ that if fulfilled ought to lead to an inexorable shift in the 
nature of employment.19 The first is a fully automated economy in which efficiency 
gains are used to give workers more free time rather than increase profits through the 
reduction of jobs and the depreciation of pay for those who remain employed. The 
second is the reduction of the working week and with it the assumed ethical superiority 
of work, which sees people engage in ‘bullshit jobs’,20 created for the sake of keeping 
people in work as paid employment is seen as a moral good. The third is the provision 
of a universal basic income to remove the economic necessity of work and bolster 
labour power. The fourth is a devaluation of the work ethic to remove the cultural 
pressure and incentive to work and the bias against non-work. These individual 




and meaningful life in a context where work no longer offers many the opportunity to 
fulfil their ambitions and dreams. 
 
The literature makes clear the need to think critically about the means of diffusing a 
post-work agenda including how such demands or policies are advocated for, through 
what material and institutional changes, and within what arenas or networks. Context 
is essential to defining the features, goals and social characteristics of economic forms 
and in this sense a feminist geographical perspective that works within and against 
the ways things already are can be useful in identifying the concerted – and spatially 
located – action necessary to remove structural barriers to equality. Technological 
advancement will not overcome the lower value of feminised labour, the barriers to 
women’s labour market participation or the wealth gap between men and women that 
will see a greater share of profits flow to men as business owners and investors, 
without government regulation to erase the disparities that lead to the unequal 
distribution of the technological risks and opportunities in the first place.  
 
The idea and practice of institutionalising an evolving, but not yet realised, post-work 
future also open up important questions regarding the politics of a prosperous and 
democratic society. Feminist research has made visible the differential meanings 
attached to the post-work imaginary and the potential for empowerment and 
disempowerment within an economy built around technology and production. Not only 
are we reminded of the historical struggle of women to become wage labour,21 but 
also the failure of advances in household technology to change the burden or division 
of domestic labour. With much of the popular debate about automation progressing in 




washing machine, refrigerator, microwave and so forth – were promoted as giving 
women in particular more ‘leisure’ time in the 1950s and ‘60s, feminist scholars such 
as Helen Hester suggest a need to be wary of the extent to which ‘post-work’ would 
necessarily equate to ‘post-capitalist’ or ‘post-patriarchy’.22 In the latest edition of their 
book, Inventing the Future, Srnicek and Williams respond to Hester’s arguments by 
arguing that a move towards full automation divorced from feminist struggles for 
gender equality will lead to a ‘misogynist post-work future’ in which there is a decrease 
in waged labour but women continue to fulfil the majority of unpaid domestic and 
reproductive work. 
 
Building on this literature, calls for a feminist reclamation of time proffer a very different 
approach to traditional feminist campaigns to secure women’s freedom and autonomy 
through work. A focus on time provides for different forms of spatial and political 
attentiveness and enables an alternative repertoire for securing gender equality. As 
the basis of a new politics, an attention to time transcends the historic confluence of 
feminist and neoliberal ideals that has seen efforts to reconfigure the world of work 
converge with the deregulation of the labour market. As is widely documented, the 
reduction of barriers to women’s labour market participation and the normalisation of 
the two-earner family has coincided with the international deregulation of markets and 
dismantling of employment rights, which has affected all workers through the 
depression of wage levels, reduction of job security and steep rise in the number of 
hours worked for wages per household. There is, then, a desire to avoid such an 
‘unholy alliance’ with contradictory state agendas and seek to redress how automation 
can intensify working lives. The nature of contemporary employment keeps workers 




was once attached to productive employment as employers have little incentive to 
harness technology to improve job satisfaction and preserve the sense of purpose 
employment once conferred. Concordantly more could be done to foster alternative 
roles and identities to overcome the inequalities emergent from the ways in which 
processes of gender, class, race, sexuality and (dis)ability are embedded in the total 
social organisation of work.23  
 
4. Conclusion 
The aspiration to recover the ‘lost’ vision of ending work that once characterised left 
political thought through the prognosis of a world of ‘automated worklessness’ needs 
to be tempered through an explicit focus on the ways people orient themselves 
differently to work, mediate between and among multi-level technological forces, and 
are dynamic and mobile among the sometimes seemingly conflictual spheres of 
production and reproduction. At a moment when technology is creating an ‘always on’ 
culture, the post-work imaginary risks being advanced and advocated without fully 
addressing how the working time/non-working time dichotomy is linked in complex 
ways to the public/private and production/reproduction divides, as well as the 
continually relevant social relations which constrain this process. Feminist geography 
can help us understand how the fourth industrial revolution blurs the boundaries 
between work and life and thus how people are being constituted as working subjects 
across a range of different sites. 
 
Grounding policy development in the material, embodied and everyday contexts of 
employment can also help to ensure that an orientation to the future of work does not 




political struggles that seek to improve the conditions of work in the here and now. 
While over time gains have been made in terms of addressing gender disparities in 
pay and promotion prospects, inequalities of work persist and women continue to 
assume the majority burden for care and domestic labour, increasing time pressures 
and exacerbating the ‘double shift’.24 Feminist geography illuminates the inherently 
political possibilities that we have to reshape the relations of power in which we live 
our lives by drawing comparisons across shared features of working lives and tracing 
of connections between these lives to inform understandings of different outcomes. 
There is not a singular future of work focused on technology and production, but rather 
a multitude of futures of work that may emerge. Too often our narratives of automation 
and futures of work tend to accept as given the likely disemployment of vast swathes 
of workers as their premise.25 This has the effect of rendering such narratives 
inevitable and stymies the critical work needed to call them into question. How we 
create and accept specific ‘truths’ about the future  of work, as geographer Sam 
Kinsley argues, is political and should be a focus of political action.26 Hence the 
mobilisation of a post-work world should not be defined as a top-down or bottom-up 
endeavour but rather something (resistance, solidarity, survival) that is produced as a 
result of reflexive and open-ended feminist praxis that engages with how this future 
can be otherwise. Working from and inhabiting such a position of undecidability can 
invigorate political imaginations, whereas the assumption of a known endpoint of 
‘Post-Work’ World risks depriving people of the agency to shape and resist changes 
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